Why is the border with Armenia important for Iran?

28.09.2022

Why is the border with Armenia important for Iran?

Text by: Zhanna Vardanyan

Since the days of the 2020 Artsakh war, Iran has been announcing that the geopolitical change in the region is unacceptable. Iran believes that the establishment of the so-called “Zangezur corridor” through Armenia is directed against Islamic Republic and can eliminate Armenian-Iranian border.   


New challenges for Iran


The 44-day Artsakh war and its consequences have created new challenges in the region not only for  Armenia and Artsakh but also for the Islamic Republic of Iran: the transfer of foreign terrorist fighters to the war zone by Azerbaijan and Turkey, the growing influence of Turkey in the South  Caucasus, the increasing of Azerbaijan-Israel relations, the so-called "Zangezur Corridor" problems are among Iran's main concerns. To neutralize these new challenges, Iran has become quite active in the South Caucasus, trying to ensure political and economic presence in the region.

Although during the 2020 Artsakh war, Tehran favored "returning Karabakh to Azerbaijan" at the end of October, when there was already a threat of military operations being transferred to the Syunik region of Armenia, which borders Iran, Tehran started to show its concerns. Since the beginning of the war, Iran has deployed military equipment at the border, but in late October-early November, additional equipment was moved to the northern borders of the country, where the armed forces of IRI conducted several military exercises as a show of military power. Moreover, Iran's high-ranking military authorities announced that the geopolitical change in the region is a “red line” for Iran. 

Armenia-Iran border

 

Zangezur or “NATO's Turanian” corridor?

After the war ended, Iran’s concerns about the potential change of the Iran-Armenia border increased because of the so-called "Zangezur Corridor" problem that emerged after the 9th November trilateral statement. There were a handful of publications in the Iranian press according to which the opening of that corridor would interrupt the Armenian-Iranian border. “The geographical borders of the Islamic Republic in this region did not change and will not change in the future. Our perception of  what has been announced is just a simple transit route, the security of which should be discussed, and  the Islamic Republic of Iran is following the issue closely,”- Saeed Khatibzadeh, the spokesperson of  the Iranian Foreign Ministry, announced on November 16, only a week after the ceasefire statement.

Iran believes that the corridor project is directed against Islamic Republic and is supported by NATO. Iranian experts emphasize that the term “Zangezur corridor” should not be used. Instead, they suggest using “NATO's Turanian corridor” formulation. The realization of the Azerbaijani-Turkish idea of the “corridor” and the possible abolition of the Armenian-Iranian border contains the following problems for Iran:

  • Iran will lose its alternative route to Europe and become dependent on Azerbaijan and Turkey, while Armenia is a reliable route for Iran.
  • The exclusively Turkic presence in the north of the country will challenge Iran's territorial integrity because there is a Turkic-speaking population in the northwestern part of Iran where active separatist propaganda is being carried out.
  • Iran can permanently be pushed out of the South Caucasus, which the Islamic Republic historically considers its zone of influence.
  • Iran will lose its transit importance for Turkey and Azerbaijan and deprive it of significant leverage over these countries.
  • An anti-Iran and pan-Turkism axis will be formed in the north of Iran.

That is why as a result of the war, Armenia's territorial integrity became a “red line” for Iran and Iranian officials started to announce it. Statements about the inadmissibility of changing the Armenian-Iranian border continued gaining new momentum in August-October 2021, when relations between Iran and Azerbaijan were tense. "Preventing changes in the borders of neighboring countries is one of the strategies of the Islamic Republic, and we consider that any geopolitical change in the region harms our internal security, and we have always declared it a ‘red line’. According to that, it is obvious that we cannot be indifferent", said Mohammad Pakpour, the ground forces commander of the IRGC.  Simultaneously, Iran again moved its military equipment to the border and held large-scale military exercises, causing rumors in Armenia about possible Iranian-Azerbaijani clashes. It was evident that after the Artsakh 44-year war, a new contrast had emerged in Iran-Azerbaijan relations.

 

Brig. Gen. Mohammad Pakpour 

 

The tensions between Baku and Tehran comparatively eased, and the two countries' presidents met in November 2021 in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan․ After the meeting, there were some rumors that Iran agreed to the opening of the “Zangezur corridor”. However, the Iranian side denied those rumors, stressing that Iran welcomed the reopening of communication channels and did not step back from its position on official borders’ unchangeability. Apparently, it is unacceptable for Iran if the “corridor” is outside the control of the Republic of Armenia and somehow harms the existence of the Armenian-Iranian border. 

The highest-level statement regarding the inadmissibility of the change of the Armenian-Iranian border was made by Ali Khamenei, the Supreme leader of IRI, on 19th July 2022, during the meetings with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, and Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia.  Iran also announced this position during Azerbaijan's new attack on Armenia on September 13-14. The attack was interpreted in Iran as an attempt to open the “corridor”.

In general, establishing a route, even not as a corridor, through the territory of Armenia is not beneficial to Tehran because the latter faces the problem of decreasing its transit role. In the context of lifting the blockade, according to the November 9 statement, Iran emphasizes the restart of the Iran-Nakhichevan-Armenia railway. This can be an alternative route for Iran in the North-South, Persian Gulf-Black Sea corridors, considering that one of the rail routes in these corridors, the Rasht-Astara section of the Qazvin-Rasht-Astara (Iran)-Astara (Azerbaijan) railway, is not fully ready yet.

 

Nikol Pashinyan with Iranian President Sayyed Ebrahim Raisi

 

Iran's attempts to neutralize new threats

To neutralize the threats against it, Iran has activated its policy in the South Caucasus. Tehran is trying to have a strong economic presence in the region and participate in political negotiations. In this context, Iran also welcomes the regional “3+3” mechanism of negotiations suggested by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ilham Aliyev, for the launch of which in January 2021, the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif made a regional tour.

From an economic point of view, Iran is actively negotiating with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The country is discussing with Baku implementation of projects in the occupied territories of Artsakh and promotion of transit cooperation. The negotiations with Armenia are particularly related to boosting bilateral trade and developing and diversifying communication channels. After the war, Tehran repeatedly expressed willingness to participate in the construction of sections of the North-South highway of Armenia passing through Syunik. With the construction of this highway, the transit importance of Armenia will increase, and an uninterrupted connection between Armenia and Iran will be ensured. The significance of the construction of this highway has doubled, especially since a part of the Goris-Kapan highway came under the control of Azerbaijan and the traffic along that section started to involve a number of obstacles. This is also why Iran wants to participate in constructing not only the North-South highway but also new routes in the Syunik region.

On the other hand, Iran increased its interest in Syunik, trying to have more presence in the region.  Tehran promoted cultural projects in Syunik, including the Navasard culinary and cultural festival held on August 10-11 in Sisian, Syunik region. The most obvious example of Iran's increased attention to Syunik is the Islamic Republic's decision to open a Consulate General in Kapan, the regional center of Syunik. Tehran has appointed Morteza Abedin Varamin, formerly Chargé d'Affaires of the Iranian Embassy in Yemen, as Consul General in Kapan.

 

Azadi square in Tehran 

 

To conclude, it can be noted that Iran views Armenia as an alternative and reliable route to Europe, as well as a factor preventing the formation of a pan-Turkism and anti-Iranian axis. Therefore, after the 44-day war, Iran has opposed the creation of roads through Armenia with a corridor logic as a result of which the Armenian-Iranian border can be eliminated. To prevent this Tehran is trying to strengthen its political and economic presence in the region. Iranian experts also emphasize that Iran should have a military presence in Syunik.

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